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
CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 March 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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Sino-Indian Border: [Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai will suggest the formation of a joint Sino-Indian border commission when he meets Indian Prime Minister Nehru in April, ]

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(N) [no time limit should be imposed on any such commission. Peiping, which found a similar tactic useful in easing its dispute with Burma, apparently hopes to ascertain Indian reaction to the possibility of a Sino-Indian commission and to broaden the effort to convince New Delhi that Communist China is prepared to be cooperative in border talks.]

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Watch Committee Conclusion--Middle East: [There has been an easing of tensions between the UAR and Israel. Although the withdrawal of some UAR military forces from the Sinai has begun, serious incidents continue possible as long as UAR forces remain near the Israeli border areas in reinforced strength.]

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Morocco: [The cabinet crisis pending since December and halted by the Agadir disaster of 1 March may come to a head within another week,]

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OK  
[Most members of the cabinet took practically no part in dealing with the disaster, thus demonstrating the moribund state of the government.]

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### III. THE WEST

Cuba: [The US Embassy in Havana sees no hope that the US will ever be able to establish a satisfactory relationship with any Cuban government dominated by Fidel Castro or his close associates. The embassy believes that the government's charges of US responsibility for the explosion in Havana harbor and the mounting anti-US frenzy in government-controlled media indicate a deliberate attempt to precipitate a crisis and force the US to take drastic measures. There have also been reports that Cubans who previously were cool to Castro's anti-American diatribes seem increasingly resentful of the US, and a minor incident could cause an outbreak of violence against US personnel or interests.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Chou En-Lai May Propose Sino-Indian Border Commission

Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai will propose a joint Sino-Indian boundary commission when he visits New Delhi in April,

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[Repeating Peiping's current propaganda line that nothing must stand in the way of friendship between the two countries,

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[no time limit should be set on the work of such a commission.]

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[Peiping found the establishment of a boundary commission a useful device for easing its dispute with Burma and one which could be used to prolong "friendly negotiations indefinitely."

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[Nehru reportedly has speculated that Chou may point to China's recent border agreement with Burma and possibly one with Nepal by the time of his visit and suggest that a precedent has been set for India.]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Replacement of Moroccan Cabinet Again Seems Imminent

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[The Moroccan cabinet crisis--halted by the Agadir disaster of 1 March--may come to a head within another week,]

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Most

members of the cabinet, including Premier Abdallah Ibrahim and Vice Premier Abderrahim Bouabid, took little part in dealing with the disaster. Most prominent in directing disaster relief were Crown Prince Moulay Hassan and Director of National Security Mohamed Laghzaoui, who have long pressed King Mohamed V to revamp his government and have for the past three months directed the police repression of left-wing supporters of Ibrahim and Bouabid.

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Meanwhile, security forces continue to move against veterans of the Moroccan resistance group and alleged terrorists said to be involved in a plot to assassinate the crown prince. [Left-wing political and labor leaders contend that the only plot is one invented by the government as an excuse to suppress Ibrahim's supporters to the benefit of Moroccan rightist groups.]

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

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